October 2 2004
1905: National monarchy & June 7
The confrontation between Norway and Sweden in 1895 confirmed Norway's willingness to negotiate with Sweden over any changes to the Union structure.  Although the positions taken by subsequent Norwegian governments supported negotiations, there were individuals who were willing to push the envelope of unilateral Norwegian action.

The June 7 Government.
Front row: Defense Minister of Olssøn (l), Minister of Commerce Arcstander, Prime Ministers Michelsen & Løvland, Finance Minister Gunnar Knudsen, Agricultural Minister Vinje.
Back row: Cabinet Ministers Bothner (l) & Hagerup Bull, Labor Minister Lehmkuhl and Church Minister Chr Knudsen

TERJE I. LEIREN

Part II

SEATTLE, WA - Increased military spending and the establishment of private gun clubs in the late 1890s, hinted at a general Norwegian intention to avoid another retreat as had occurred in June, 1895, when the Norwegian Storting agreed to abandon its attempt to establish separate consulates and a foreign office for Norway.

Divided

Politically, Norwegians were also divided. Conservatives generally supported the Union and by extension, the Union king. The traditions of monarchy signaled stability politically and socially for Høyre and its adherents. The Liberals, particularly the more radical, had by and large become convinced that monarchy not only favored the social elite, they also viewed the Union monarchy as Swedish with loyalties that would always favor “Big Brother” in Stockholm. While Norway's growing emphasis on shipping and Sweden's continued protectionist policies argued for separate Norwegian and Swedish consulate representatives to deal with their distinctly separate economic interests, political ideology tended to keep liberal and conservative Norwegians from recognizing common national interests.  Liberals, by and large, rejected monarchy as a tool of the monied interests, while conservatives feared the economic and political chaos that they were certain a republic would bring.  It appeared that no common Norwegian policy could be articulated.  That would change, however, in 1898, when Sigurd Ibsen, the son of Henrik Ibsen, published an essay titled “National Monarchy.”

“National Monarchy”

“National Monarchy” appeared in two installments in Ringeren, a weekly magazine which Ibsen edited. Founded in late 1897, Ringeren had become a forum for the debate of contemporary political and cultural issues. No issue was more compelling to Ibsen than the issue of Norway's union with Sweden.  Following a trial number in November, 1897, Ringeren began to appear regularly on New Year's Day, 1898. Before the month was out, Ibsen himself authored a critical analysis of the psychology of the Norwegian-Swedish Union. He noted that Norway's position in the Union was one of inferiority.  The inherent weakness of the Union, according to Ibsen, rested on Sweden's refusal to admit or to understand Norway's “natural right to equality.”  “The disdain which the Swedes have for us is not a unique phenomenon,” Ibsen wrote. “It has its parallel in the contempt the British have for the Irish, which the German-Austrian has for the Czech, which the east European has for the Jew.” Because Norwegians were looked down upon by Swedes as unequal, negotiations between the two would simply never succeed.  Norway's only alternative was to stand united with Conservatives and Liberals agreeing on a common policy. But, Ibsen asked rhetorically, since Conservatives rejected any possibility of dissolution and feared a republic, and Liberals rejected the Union monarchy as “non- Norwegian” and representative of conservative interests, how could there be any unified Norwegian policy? In 1898, Ibsen outlined the answers in his remarkable essay on national monarchy.

The June 7 Storting.


“Surrogate Monarchy”

A reform of the Norwegian-Swedish Union was not likely, Ibsen concluded. The king was, in theory, a union king, but his residence bound him to Sweden and his impressions were formed in that country, not in Norway. As long as the Union existed, Ibsen believed, Norway would always be seen as inferior.  The Norwegian monarchy would remain a monarchy in theory alone, “a surrogate monarchy.”  The most logical development for such a monarchy and such a Union would be its mutually agreed-to dissolution.  Norway would thereby gain its independence while also alleviating Sweden's fears of the foreign policy consequences of such a development.  The Union monarch, Ibsen wrote, would abdicate as king of Norway. His youngest son, Duke Karl, would assume the throne of Norway, thereby giving the Norwegians their own king and making possible a “peaceful divorce without bitterness.”  But if republicans objected to a new monarch, Ibsen argued that breaking the bonds of the Union would in itself be unwelcome by Europe's heads of State, instituting a republic would only bring Norway into a “tense and chilly” relationship with monarchical Europe. Damaging as it would be to foreign relations, Ibsen believed it would be even more catastrophic internally.

Norwegian Dynasty

There were doubts that conservatives would accept independence on any terms. The abolition of the monarchy would insure their hostility. A republic, Ibsen argued, would split Norway internally and isolate her externally. A separate Norwegian dynasty, even a Bernadotte, would be acceptable to conservatives because it would mean the continuation of the previous regime.  Liberals, especially those of Venstre, might complain, but ultimately accept “our Norwegian royal house.” Ibsen believed, correctly, it would turn out, that republican sentiment in Norway was less ideological than nationalist and anti-Swedish.  If modern monarchy could accommodate itself to popular sovereignty and national sentiment in continental Europe, why not in Norway where it is the Union that is so vilified. The radical element of Norwegian society, especially the small Norwegian Labor Party, continued to see monarchy as a hindrance to necessary social and political reforms. While hoping that his ideas would spark a national discussion and perhaps a new national unity, instead they seem to have generated only minimal interest and comment in the Norwegian and Swedish press. Ibsen himself would subsequently write that his ideas received no more than “a shrug of the shoulders.” Instead of fighting the establishment, Ibsen would subsequently accept an appointment to the ministry of the interior where he sought to articulate a mutually agreeable policy that might find Swedish acceptance of Norwegian separation.

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Author: Dr. Terje Leiren
Source: Norwegian American Foundation